The Gerontologist
Vol. 47, No. 2, 224–234

Copyright 2007 by The Gerontological Society of America

The Economic Consequences of Widowhood
for Older Minority Women
Jacqueline L. Angel, PhD,1,2 Maren A. Jimenez, MA,2 and Ronald J. Angel, PhD2
´
Purpose: We compare the economic consequences
of widowhood for preretirement age and earlyretirement age Black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic
White women. Methods: We use the 1992 and
2000 waves of the Health and Retirement Study to
assess the effects of widowhood on the household
incomes and assets of non-Hispanic White, Black,
and Hispanic women who were 51 years of age or
older at baseline (N = 4,544). Results: For women
of all racial and ethnic groups, marital disruption,
including widowhood, results in a substantial decline
in household income and assets. Net of demographic
controls, the relative loss is far greater for Black and
Hispanic widows than for non-Hispanic White
widows. Implications: The data reveal a substantial
widowhood penalty for total household income and
net worth for women in each racial and ethnic group.
However, the ﬁndings suggest that minority widows
are at a particularly high risk of poverty in late life,
given that they have lower incomes and fewer assets
to begin with. Implications of the results for the
ﬁnancial security of women approaching retirement
are discussed.
Key Words: Assets, Black and Hispanic Women,
Health and Retirement Study, Income, Widowhood

During the closing decades of the twentieth
century, the normative marital and family situations
of women changed dramatically. Today a lifelong
marriage to a single partner has become less
common than it was in earlier times for all income,
racial, and ethnic groups. These changes in marital
patterns have potentially profound implications for
women’s economic security in late life. For an
increasing number of women, and particularly
Address correspondence to Jacqueline L. Angel, University of Texas
at Austin, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, PO Box Y,
Austin, TX 78713. E-mail: jangel@mail.utexas.edu
1
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of
Texas at Austin.
2
Population Research Center, The University of Texas at Austin.

224

minority group women, marriage does not represent
a guarantee of ﬁnancial stability in old age
(Harrington Meyer, Wolf, & Himes, 2006). Despite
this new social and family reality, though, many
women who are currently approaching retirement
age spent their adulthood under the old normative
system in which a woman’s economic security
depended on that of her husband. For these older
women, retirement security is closely tied to their
husband’s level of asset accumulation, as well as
their own marital histories (Smock, 1993; Waite &
Gallagher, 2000).
In the traditional marital and work systems,
a husband occupied the role of primary breadwinner
and a wife’s labor force activity, if she worked outside
the home at all, remained largely supplemental.
Today, even middle-class women often ﬁnd that
they cannot rely on a husband to guarantee their
ﬁnancial security in later life. By the year 2000,
approximately 13% of women over the age of 40 were
divorced (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Nevertheless,
women are less likely than men to have their own
deﬁned-beneﬁt or deﬁned-contribution retirement
plan, and even when they do have one, they receive
signiﬁcantly lower pensions (Wilmoth & Koso, 2002).
For older women, widowhood remains the most
common marital transition, and for minority group
women, as for those who have never worked themselves, or those whose husbands spent their lives in
manual labor with low incomes and episodic work
histories, economic insecurity in old age has always
been a fact of life and widowhood has meant only
further hardship (Holden & Kuo, 1996; Holden &
Smeeding, 1990; Holden & Smock, 1991; Jenkins
2003; Wise, 1996; Zick & Smith, 1991). Increasingly,
though, marital disruption occurs early in a woman’s
life, well before a woman faces the elevated risk of
widowhood associated with aging, and has important implications for her old age economic security.
In what follows we compare the household income
and assets of Black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic
White widows with those of similarly aged women in
other common marital statuses in the preretirement
and early-retirement years. Given the complexity of
contemporary marital histories, an understanding of
The Gerontologist

the economic consequences of widowhood and other
marital statuses on women’s economic security in
later life has important policy implications.
We focus on minority group status and widowhood because of the fact that, given their lifelong
economic disadvantage and the inability of many
minority couples to accumulate substantial wealth,
widowhood can represent a particularly serious
threat to economic security for older minority
women. Although the overall economic situation of
elderly Americans has improved greatly in recent
decades, leaving less than 9% below poverty, Black
and Hispanic women remain particularly vulnerable
to poverty in old age (Ozawa, 1995). Several
signiﬁcant racial and ethnic trends may account for
economic hardship among women. Black women
have higher employment rates, deﬁned in terms of
the proportion of the population group in the labor
force, than do Hispanic women (63.2% vs 56.9%) in
the 2000 Census (Fullerton & Toosi, 2001). Disparities also exist for Black and Hispanic women’s
median weekly earnings ($491 and $410, respectively) compared with non-Hispanic White women
($567) in 2003 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004).
The late-life economic consequences of the double
jeopardy of minority group status and being female,
then, reﬂect the lifelong disadvantages that begin
in the earliest years of the life course (Hatch, 1999).
Many of these women have limited or no paid work
histories, low lifetime earnings, and no personal
pensions (Angel & Angel, 1996; Kijakazi, 2001;
Lupton & Smith, 2003; Smith, 1995; Smith &
Kington, 1997). Data from the Current Population
Survey indicates that Hispanic widows were the least
likely to receive private pension income between
1994 and 1998 (10.1%), followed by Blacks (16.4%)
and non-Hispanic White widows (22.8%; see
Kijakazi). In addition, minority women are also
less likely than non-Hispanic White women to have
adequate health insurance coverage throughout the
life course. This lack of insurance reﬂects their
lifelong economic vulnerability as well as their own
and their spouse’s labor force disadvantage. The lack
of insurance feeds back in a vicious cycle that
includes compromised health and diminished life
chances (Institute of Medicine, 2001).
Black and Hispanic women often do not qualify
for Social Security on the basis of their own employment, because they have not made the required
10 years (or 40 quarters) of contributions (U.S.
Government Accounting Ofﬁce, 1998). In addition,
many do not claim spousal or widow (noncontributory) beneﬁts because they are either ineligible as
a result of the marriage requirement (in the case of
divorcees), or a spouse was not fully covered at the
time of his death. Given current marital trends, fewer
minority women will be eligible for spouse and
widow beneﬁts in the future (Harrington Meyer,
Wolf, & Himes, 2004). Even when they receive
Social Security, minority group women and widows
Vol. 47, No. 2, 2007

225

often receive only the minimal payment, and they
lack other retirement income sources (Social Security
Administration, 2002).1
For afﬂuent women, the loss of a husband may
result in a substantial drop in income, but if the couple has substantial community property then the
loss of income can be compensated for through the
liquidation of assets. Fewer Black and Hispanic
women than non-Hispanic White women have such
accumulated assets (Honig, 2000). Nevertheless, the
majority of women, including Hispanic and Black
women, will spend many years without a husband
in old age. In 2003 only 25.4% of Black women and
39.9% of Hispanic women aged 65 years and older
lived with a spouse (He, Sengupta, Velkoff, &
DeBarros, 2005). In addition to widowhood, these
living arrangement patterns reﬂect high rates of
marital disruption among minority couples, as well
as low rates of marriage among Blacks (Holden &
Kuo, 1996; Kreider & Fields, 2002). The situation is
compounded by the fact that Hispanic and Black
women are also less likely than non-Hispanic Whites
to remarry after divorce (Norton & Miller, 1992).
As they are forced to liquidate assets, many
widows suffer a long-term decline in income and net
worth. The level of accumulation during the marriage, therefore, is particularly important, because
on average the longer a couple is married, the more
communal wealth they accumulate (Holden & Kuo,
1996; Holden & Smock, 1991; Smith & Kington,
1997; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zick & Holden,
2000). If a couple that has paid for their home and
acquired other property remains together until the
husband dies, then the widow inherits the communal
property and often some portion of her husband’s
retirement if her husband had a private pension and
if it included survivor’s beneﬁts. She also usually
qualiﬁes for survivor’s beneﬁts or her own Social
Security beneﬁt payment based on her employment
history (Harrington Meyer et al., 2006). Given the
lifelong labor force disadvantage faced by Blacks and
Hispanics, a minority couple’s asset accumulation
often remains inadequate, even if they remain
married; they risk serious poverty in old age (Crystal
& Shea, 2003; Holden & Smock, 1991; Johnson,
Sambamoorthi, & Crystal, 2003; Wolff, 2003). In
2001, the income of Black couples was only 80% that
of non-Hispanic White couples, and Black couples
had accumulated only one fourth the net worth of
White couples (Shapiro, 2003). Few studies have
examined Hispanic ethnicity differences in wealth,
but data from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) show that Hispanic households fare worse
than Black households (Angel & Angel, 1996),
averaging 70% of non-Hispanic White couple household income, and only 30% of White household
wealth (Smith, 1995).
Although marriage remains a major source of
ﬁnancial protection for women in old age, their own
retirement income can play an important role. All else

being equal, those women who have been employed
tend to be better off economically in old age than
women who have not been employed (Willson &
Hardy, 2002). Despite the episodic and often casual
nature of the work in which they engage, their own
employment is particularly important among Black
women (Willson, 2003). For a disproportionate
fraction of Black and Hispanic women, retirement
planning is particularly problematic and may be more
difﬁcult because they are low paid and poorly
educated (Lichter, LeClere, & McLaughlin, 1991).
Episodic employment, which is typical of the employment histories of low-income minority women,
provides little by way of retirement security (Bound,
Schoenbaum, & Waidmann, 1996; Willson, 2003).
The literature, then, identiﬁes various key factors
that increase the probability of economic security for
older women. A lifelong marriage to a husband with
a high income and a generous retirement plan is
clearly an asset. Having one’s own retirement plan is
increasingly important for women as marital dissolution becomes more common. The combination of
a large communal estate and income from both
private retirement plans and Social Security undoubtedly guarantees an older woman’s ﬁnancial wellbeing. Unfortunately, for many minority group
women nearing retirement, few of these sources of
economic security are available. In what follows we
assess the differential impact of widowhood on the
economic situation of Black, Hispanic, and nonHispanic White women in the preretirement and early
retirement years. In order to assess the relative impact
of widowhood on economic well-being, we include
divorced women as a comparison in order to compare
the magnitude of any decrement. Although the
literature points to potentially deleterious effects of
widowhood on economic well-being, the differential
impact of widowhood for different racial and ethnic
groups remains poorly understood (cf. Wilmoth &
Koso, 2002). From what is known, we might expect
that although non-Hispanic White women may suffer
larger absolute declines in income and assets as the
result of widowhood, the relative loss and the
practical consequences for economic security will be
larger for Black and Hispanic women who enter the
retirement years with lower incomes and fewer assets.

Data and Methods
In order to investigate the absolute and relative
economic consequences of widowhood for nonHispanic White, Hispanic, and Black women, we
use two waves (1992 and 2000) of the HRS, a
longitudinal dataset consisting of a nationwide representative sample of individuals who were born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses (Heeringa &
Connor, 1995). The HRS consists of ﬁve waves
collected in 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000, but we
use only the ﬁrst and last waves. Given our focus on
226

the relative impact of widowhood for Black and
Hispanic women, more detailed analyses of different
patterns of change are not possible given the small
sample sizes and small number of transitions other
than widowhood during the interim. As a result, we
focus only on net changes over the 8-year period
between 1992 and 2000. However, we do include
divorced women as a comparison group to contrast
them to the magnitude of income and asset loss
associated with widowhood.
The HRS respondents were between the ages of
51 and 61 years at the time of the baseline survey in
1992. As part of the survey, researchers collected
information on the respondents’ employment and
marital histories, as well as their incomes and
ﬁnancial assets. They collected similar information
for their spouses. Researchers reinterviewed the
respondents in 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000. At the
time of the 2000 interview, the original respondents
were between the ages of 59 and 69. Their spouses
could have been of any age. More than 81% of the
12,521 respondents interviewed at baseline were also
interviewed in 2000. Of the original sample interviewed, 8.7% was lost as a result of mortality by the
ﬁfth wave in 2000 (Health and Retirement Study,
2002). Comparisons of the demographic and economic characteristics of those lost to follow-up and
those recontacted showed that there were no
statistically signiﬁcant group differences (t test) in
total household income and total household net
worth. Respondents who were lost to follow-up
were slightly older and had fewer years of education
completed than did women who were interviewed
at both waves.2
For the purposes of analysis, we exclude spouses
who were younger than 51 years of age at the baseline
survey in order to more clearly focus on the experiences of women near or at retirement age (n =
1,049). We include spouses who were older than 61
years of age (n=109) in 1992 in order to maximize the
Black and Hispanic samples. Because the HRS oversampled Blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents,3 it
provides a unique opportunity to examine racial and
ethnic differences in women’s economic well-being
(Jackson, Lockery, & Juster, 1996). Women of racial
and ethnic categories other than non-Hispanic White,
Black, or Hispanic (n = 133) are dropped from the
analysis. Finally, because of the fact that never
married women and those who remarry in late life
are theoretically different than married, divorced, or
widowed women on multiple dimensions, they are
excluded from the multivariate analyses (Rubenstein,
1987). This category represents a nonnormative
marital pattern for this historical period.
Measures
Economic disadvantage among mature minority
women is associated with a variety of factors,
including prior marital disruption. By employing
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the HRS, we can observe the income and wealth
effects associated with minority group and marital
statuses in late middle adulthood. Midlife is a critical
point in the life course at which a couple’s or an
individual’s income is close to its maximum and
a time by which a large portion of one’s lifetime asset
accumulation has already occurred. It is also a time
of the life course at which expenses can increase or
adversity can take an economic toll. The need to help
children ﬁnancially, a medical crisis, the onset of
chronic diseases such as diabetes or hypertension, or
the loss of a long-term job can undermine a couple’s
economic security. By the middle and late 50s, one’s
possibilities for an economically secure retirement
are largely determined. It is an ideal period in the
adult life course, therefore, to compare the situations
of Hispanic, Black, and non-Hispanic White women.

Dependent Variable
A variety of income and wealth measures are
available at each wave of the HRS (Smith, 1995).
Total household income includes income from all
sources received during the year preceding the
survey, which includes the following: respondent’s
earnings, household capital income, income from
employer pension or annuity, income from Social
Security DI or SSI, income from Social Security
retirement, unemployment or worker’s compensation, income from other government transfers, and
the income of all other household members. Total
household net worth is measured as the value of all
assets minus total debt. More speciﬁcally, it is the
sum of the net value of real estate, vehicles, and
businesses; IRA/Keogh accounts, stocks, mutual
funds, and investment trusts; the value of checking,
savings, or money market accounts; of CD, government savings bonds, and T-bills; the net value of
bonds and bond funds; and the net value of all other
savings, minus the value of other debt, including
mortgages and other home loans.
Total household income and total household net
worth for Time 1 and Time 2 are estimates developed by the RAND Corporation and are based
on a multistage approach to imputing values for
missing income and assets for those respondents who
did not provide answers to these questions. The
RAND HRS Data ﬁle is a user-friendly version of the
longitudinal HRS data. It is particularly useful when
one is dealing with income and asset measures,
because it combines the cumbersome number of
measures included in the original version of the HRS
into fewer variables. In addition, we set negative
assets to zero, and we inﬂated income and assets for
Time 1 to 1999 and 2000 values, respectively. The
inﬂation factor we used is based on the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index and the year
in which the income (1991) and asset (1992) data
were collected. Because of the skewed distribution
Vol. 47, No. 2, 2007

227

of income and assets, we truncate each at the 90th
percentile.
Independent Variables
We used several well-known factors to characterize a woman’s (respondent’s) economic situation,
including marital history, age, education, race, and
Hispanic ethnicity. To differentiate among marital
statuses between 1992 and 2000, we created four categories. Two refer to widows: (a) no change, which
included those respondents who were widowed at
both Time 1 and Time 2; and (b) newly widowed
women who were married in Time 1 but widowed by
Time 2. We include two other marital statuses in
order to compare widows with women in other
common marital situations: (c) women who were
divorced or separated at both Time 1 and Time 2,
and (d) women who were married at both waves.
Initially we included a dichotomous variable for
those who had experienced a marital disruption
prior to 1992, as well as continuous variables for the
number of years a woman had been married prior to
the ﬁrst wave and the total number of children she
had had. None of these variables were signiﬁcant,
and thus we do not present them in the ﬁnal models.
Indicators of women’s paid employment and current
occupation were also not signiﬁcant, so we do not
present these results either.
The remaining independent variables are all
measured at Time 1. Demographic controls include
age in years; education, categorized as less than high
school, high school, and more than high school; and
race and ethnicity. Furthermore, we include controls
for total household income and total household net
worth at baseline to account for initial levels of
income and assets in change models. Our multivariate analyses are based on ordinary least squares
regression (Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan, 1990).

Results
Table 1 presents weighted baseline sample characteristics for Hispanic, Black, and non-Hispanic
White women. Hispanic and Black women have
lower educational levels, lower income, and approximately half the assets of non-Hispanic Whites. All
groups are of roughly similar age. Black women are
twice as likely as non-Hispanic White or Hispanic
women to be widowed in late middle age.
Table 2 presents information on marital status at
Time 1 and Time 2 by race and Hispanic ethnicity.
The ﬁrst row shows that Black women were far less
likely than either non-Hispanic White or Hispanic
women to have been married at both interviews. A
far larger proportion of Black women than either of
the other two groups were divorced at both times.
Hispanic women are somewhat more likely than

Table 1. Weighted Descriptive Statistics at Time 1, 1992

Sample Characteristics

Non-Hispanic
White

Black

Table 2. Stability and Change in Marital Status Between
1992 and 2000 by Race and Hispanic Ethnicity

Hispanic

Demographic characteristics
Age (years)

55.9

55.7

55.5

Education
Less than high school
High school
More than high school

18.2
43.8
38.0

39.0
32.1
28.9

Race or Hispanic Ethnicity

64.7
17.6
17.7

Marital status
Married
Divorced or separated
Widowed
Never married
Income and assets
Total household
income
Total household
net worth
Unweighted n

78.7
11.2
7.4
2.7

50,802.77
268,496.60
3039

48.8
25.6
17.6
8.0

28,356.39

Type of Marital
Status Change
Married T1 and T2
Divorced T1 and T2
Widowed T1 and T2
Widowed between T1
and T2
Married between T1
and T2
Divorced or separated
between T1 and T2
Never married

68.3
19.5
8.4
3.8

26,622.38

Non-Hispanic
White
68.3 (2103)
10.4 (301)
6.9 (196)

Black

Hispanic

37.6 (283) 58.7 (218)
24.8 (153) 17.8 (59)
17.4 (111) 8.4 (28)

8.6 (275)

8.7 (60)

7.2 (24)

1.4 (38)

1.2 (9)

1.8 (6)

1.8 (53)
2.6 (73)

2.5 (16)
7.6 (47)

2.1 (7)
3.8 (13)

Notes: Unweighted n sizes are given in parentheses. Information is from the Health and Retirement Study Public Use
Dataset, 1992–2000 (2002). T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2.

69,166.56 127,965.08
681

356

Note: Information is from the Health and Retirement Study
Public Use Dataset, 1992–2000 (2002).

non-Hispanic White women to have been divorced at
both times. Black women were also more likely than
the other two groups to have been widowed at both
waves. The proportion of women who were married
at Time 1 but widowed by Time 2 is similar for all
groups, roughly 8%. Only small fractions of women
of any group divorced or married between the two
waves. Blacks were also twice as likely as the other
racial or ethnic groups to never have married.
Tables 3 and 4 present measures of income and
assets by marital status at Time 1 and the amount of
change in income and assets between Time 1 and
Time 2 in 1999 and 2000 dollars, the years the
information was collected. In these tables, neither
assets nor income is truncated. Table 3 presents
information on total household income in 1992 (top
panel) and the change in household income between
1992 and 2000 (bottom panel). The ﬁrst row of the
top panel reveals that among women who were
married at both waves, non-Hispanic White women
had far higher incomes than either Black or Hispanic
women in 1992. Among those who were widowed at
both waves, non-Hispanic White women had the
highest incomes, although their income was far
lower than that of non-Hispanic White women who
remained married. Among those who were divorced
at both waves, Hispanic women had the lowest
initial incomes.
The ﬁrst row of the second panel shows that
among those who were married at both waves, nonHispanic women experienced a substantially smaller
absolute loss ($1,150 or 1.6%) in income, a loss that
was far smaller than that of Blacks ($6,737 or 13.6%)
or Hispanic women ($6,158 or 15.3%). Among those
women who became widows between 1992 and 2000,
228

all groups suffered substantial losses in income, but
these were larger for non-Hispanic White women
($22,534 or 39.7%) and Black women ($22,121 or
54.6%) than for Hispanic women ($10,933 or
27.1%). Among those women who were widowed
at both waves, non-Hispanic women ($5,164) suffered the largest loss in income, and among the small
number of women who were divorced at both waves,
Blacks suffered the largest loss ($4,830 or 19%).
Table 4 presents similar information for total
household net worth. The ﬁrst row of the top panel
reveals that among those women who were married
at both waves, non-Hispanic White women lived in
households with far greater assets in 1992 than did
either Black or Hispanic women. Among those who
were widowed at both Time 1 and Time 2, nonHispanic White women also had the highest net
worth at the ﬁrst wave compared with Black women.
In contrast, continuously married Hispanic women
suffered a slight drop in household assets at the
follow-up ($25,604 or 12.7%). Among those women
who became widowed, as among the comparison
group of divorced women, non-Hispanic White
women had the highest initial net worth, followed
by Hispanic women.
The second panel of Table 4 shows changes
between 1992 and 2000 in net worth for the different
marital statuses. The ﬁrst row reveals that among
those women who were married at both Time 1 and
Time 2, non-Hispanic Whites experienced an increase in net worth of $174,261 or 44%). Similarly,
continuously married Black women also reported an
increase in assets ($38,318 or 35.3%). In contrast,
Hispanic women experienced a net loss of $25,605 or
12.7%. Non-Hispanic White divorced or separated
women experienced modest increases in net worth
($43,209 or 37.1%), whereas Hispanic women
experienced a loss of $3,227 or 7.7%. These patterns
are similar to the comparison group of divorced
The Gerontologist

Table 3. 1992 Household Income and Change in Household Income Between 1992 and 2000 (Year 1999 Dollars)
Type of Marital Status Change

Non-Hispanic White

Black

Hispanic

72,113
31,966
56,793
27,660

49,670
16,252
40,539
25,406

40,157
12,072
40,614
13,514

1992 income
Married T1 and T2
Widowed T1 and T2
Widowed between T1 and T2
Divorced or separated T1 and T2
Change in income between 1992 and 2000
Married T1 and T2
Widowed T1 and T2
Widowed between T1 and T2
Divorced or separated at T1 and T2

À1,150
À5,164
À22,534
1,124

(À1.6%)
(À16.1%)
(À39.7%)
(3.0%)

À6,737
À1,452
À22,121
À4,830

(À13.6%)
(À8.9%)
(À54.6%)
(À19.0%)

À6,158
4,813
À10,933
554

(À15.3%)
(39.9%)
(À27.1%)
(4.1%)

Notes: T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2. Information is from the Health and Retirement Study Public Use Dataset, 1992–2000 (2002).

women. Among women who became widowed
between the two interviews, all three groups
experience losses in net worth, and the amount is
largest for Hispanic women, $113,401, compared
with $34,545 for non-Hispanic White widows and
$24,826 for Black widows.
In Table 5 we present ordinary least square
regressions of total household income for 1999
(Models 1 and 2) and change in total household
income between 1992 and 1999 (Models 3 and 4) on
the various marital status comparisons and demographic controls. Models 2 and 4 include
multiplicative interaction terms based on race and
Hispanic ethnicity and marital status between the
two waves. Non-Hispanic White women who were
married at both Time 1 and Time 2 serve as the
reference category. Model 1 explains 34% of the
variance and demonstrates that women who were
divorced or widowed at both Time 1 and Time 2 and
those who became widowed between Time 1 and
Time 2 had over $20,000 less in household income
than did women who were married at both Time 1
and Time 2, the reference category. In addition, this
model has signiﬁcant independent negative effects
associated with both race and Hispanic ethnicity. In
Model 2 the interaction terms based on race,
Hispanic ethnicity, and marital status produce only

one signiﬁcant interaction, that between Black and
divorce, at both Time 1 and Time 2.
Models 3 and 4, the last two columns of Table 5,
predict the net total household income at Wave 5 net
of Time 1 income. Model 4 includes the interaction
terms between race or ethnicity and marital status.
Model 3 reveals that, compared with women who
were married at both Time 1 and Time 2, women in
all other marital statuses suffered losses in total
household income between Time 1 and Time 2.
Women who became widows between the two waves
suffered the largest decline, $18,062. In Model 4,
none of the interaction terms are signiﬁcant.
The models in Table 6 are similar to those in
Table 5 except they predict the inﬂuence of changes
in marital status between Time 1 and Time 2 on
household net worth at Time 2 (in Year 2000
dollars). Model 1 explains 26% of the variation in
household net worth in 2000 and reveals that
compared with women who were married at both
Time 1 and Time 2, women in all other marital
categories experienced large losses in net worth.
Women who were divorced at both Time 1 and Time
2 reported the largest loss ($159,743). This model
also reveals large independent losses in net worth for
both Hispanic and black women.
In Model 2 four interaction terms are signiﬁcant,

Table 4. 1992 Household Assets and Change in Household Assets Between 1992 and 2000 (Year 2000 Dollars)
Type of Marital Status Change
1992 Net Assets
Married T1 and T2
Widowed T1 and T2
Widowed between T1 and T2
Divorced or separated T1 and T2
Change in net assets between 1992 and 2000
Married T1 and T2
Widowed T1 and T2
Widowed between T1 and T2
Divorced or separated T1 and T2

Non-Hispanic White

Black

Hispanic

396,242
174,073
282,223
116,354

108,450
46,457
40,539
61,997

201,779
79,618
238,403
41,789

174,261
10,852
À34,545
43,209

(44%)
(6.2%)
(À12.2%)
(37.1%)

38,318
À838
À24,826
490

(35.3%)
(À2.0%)
(À61.2%)
(7.9%)

À25,605
À18,027
À113,401
À3,227

(À12.7%)
(À22.6%)
(À47.6%)
(À7.7%)

Notes: T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2. Information is from the Health and Retirement Study Public Use Dataset, 1992–2000 (2002).

Vol. 47, No. 2, 2007

229

Table 5. Unweighted Linear Regressions Predicting Household Income at Time 2 (Year 1999 Dollars)
Total Household Income
Comparison or Control

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept
Net income T1
Marital change
Widowed T1 and T2
Widowed between T1 and T2
Divorced or separated T1 and T2

103,847***
—

104,093***
—

69,508***
0.39***

69,774***
0.39***

À22,149***
À21,221***
À24,016***

À23,898***
À22,144***
À26,729***

À11,129***
À17,417***
À12,130***

À12,701***
À18,062***
À13,410***

À990***

À985***

À766***

À765***

Education
Less than high school
More than high school

À10,919***
15,433***

À10,830***
15,383***

À6,328***
8,563***

À6,309***
8,535***

Race or ethnicity
Hispanic
Black

À11,212***
À9,043***

À13,499***
À11,818***

À6,145***
À5,950***

À7,709***
À7,479***

—
—
—
—
—
—

3,950
1,761
3,862
6,485
5,806
3,621

0.46
3,814

0.46
3,814

Demographics
Age

Interaction terms
Black 3 Widowed
Black 3 Widowed T1 and T2
Black 3 Divorced or separated
Hispanic 3 Widowed
Hispanic 3 Widowed T1 and T2
Hispanic 3 Divorced or Separated
Adjusted R2
N

—
—
—
—
—

5,058
3,663
8,241**
7,928
6,262
7,350

0.34
3,814

0.34
3,814

Notes: Unweighted linear regressions predicting household income at Time 2 (Year 1999 dollars) are truncated at the 90th percentile (income = $109,140). For marital change, reference = married; for education, reference = high school; for race or ethnicity, reference = Non-Hispanic White. T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2. Information is from the Health and Retirement Study
Public Use Dataset, 1992–2000 (2002).
*p .05; **p .01; ***p .0001.

those for (1) black women who were divorced at
both Time 1 and Time 2, who lost; (2) black women
who were widowed at both Time 1 and Time 2; (3)
black women who were widowed between Time 1
and Time 2; and (4) Hispanic women who were
divorced at both Time 1 and Time 2. All of the
interactions are positive and reduce the net losses
associated with marital status, race and ethnicity. In
this model the main effects for race and ethnicity, as
well as for marital status, decrease.
Between Time 1 and Time 2, the loss associated with remaining divorced for black women is
$202,372 plus an additional loss of $185,599
associated with being black, minus $131,402 for the
interaction, resulting in a total penalty of $256,569 in
net worth. At Time 2, for divorced Hispanic women
who did not remarry the penalty is $244,038; for
black women who became widowed the penalty is
$228,679; and for black widows who did not remarry
the penalty is $244,525.
Model 3 controls for assets at Time 1. It reveals
signiﬁcant losses in net worth associated with all of
the marital statuses other than married at both Time
1 and Time 2. As in the previous models black and
Hispanic women experience large losses in net worth
in all marital statuses. Model 4, introduces the
230

interactions between race, Hispanic ethnicity, and
marital status changes between Time 1 and Time 2.
It reveals three signiﬁcant effects, (a) black women
who were divorced at both Time 1 and Time 2; (b)
black women who were widowed at both Time 1
and Time 2; and (c) Hispanic women who were
divorced at both Time 1 and Time 2. Again these
coefﬁcients are positive and reduce the net impacts of
marital status, race, and ethnicity but do not
eliminate the penalty suffered by black and Hispanic
widowed and divorced women.
For non-Hispanic black women, the effect of
being continuously divorced (as opposed to being
continuously married) is less than that for nonHispanic white women (À$14,005 vs À$62,023).
Hispanic women who remain divorced lose less
than other groups ($6,100). Furthermore, among
non-Hispanic black women the effect of being
continuously widowed on assets are less than that
those for non-Hispanic white woman ($13,556 vs
$64,207). Among Hispanic women, the effect of
being continuously widowed on assets is not
signiﬁcant. Additionally, non-Hispanic black women
who were widowed at both times experienced a loss
of $86,323. Combining the coefﬁcients for marital
status, race or ethnicity, and the signiﬁcant inThe Gerontologist

Table 6. Unweighted Linear Regressions Predicting Household Net Worth at Time 2 (Year 2000 Dollars)
Total Net Household Assets
Comparison or Control
Intercept
Net Assets T1
Marital change
Widowed T1 and T2
Widowed between T1 and T2
Divorced or separated T1 and T2
Demographics
Age
Education
Less than high school
More than high school
Race or ethnicity
Hispanic
Black
Interaction terms
Black 3 Widowed
Black 3 Widowed T1 and T2
Black 3 Divorced or separated
Hispanic 3 Widowed
Hispanic 3 Widowed T1 and T2
Hispanic 3 Divorced or separated
Adjusted R2
N

Model 1

Model 2

255,727.00***
—

260,539.00***
—

252,129.00***
0.92***

254,478.00***
0.91***

À122,372***
À101,299***
À159,743***

À148,959***
À117,946***
À202,372***

À47,295***
À58,956***
À45,181***

À63,554***
À67,776***
À61,985***

À2,849**

À2,804**

899

995

Model 3

Model 4

À90,632***
112,951***

À89,468***
112,141***

À29,238***
34,561***

À29,159***
34,406***

À126,109***
À137,832***

À158,250***
À185,599***

À62,245***
À48,721***

À79,557***
À69,282***

—
—
—
—
—
—

90,033**
74,866**
131,402***
83,744
92,179
116,584**

—
—
—
—
—
—

50,034*
32,015
47,507*
43,239
60,392
55,428*

0.26
3,814

0.27
3,814

0.61
3,814

0.61
3,814

Notes: Unweighted linear regressions predicting household net worth at Time 2 (Year 2000 dollars) are truncated at the 90th
percentile (assets = $591,914). For marital change, reference = married; for education, reference = high school; for race or ethnicity, reference = Non-Hispanic White. T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2. Information is from the Health and Retirement Study Public
Use Dataset, 1992–2000 (2002).
*p .05; **p .01; ***p .0001.

teraction terms, we ﬁnd that the penalty for black
women who were divorced at both Time 1 and Time
2 is $83,760 and for Hispanics who were divorced at
both interviews the penalty is $86,114. For black
women who remain widowed between Time 1 and
Time 2 the penalty is $82,802.

Discussion
Previous research and our data indicate clearly
that a woman’s ﬁnancial situation in the preretirement years and later is determined by her marital
history, as well as her current marital status (e.g.,
Holden & Smock, 1991; Weir et al., 2002). Although
the results of the analysis reveal clear economic
penalties associated with all marital statuses other
than continuously married, our primary focus was
on widowhood, and the data unambiguously show
that widows, including those who were widowed
before our initial interview and those who became
widowed during the study period, experienced
signiﬁcant and substantial losses in income and net
worth. For minority women, this decline began from
a lower point because minority couples in general are
less able than non-Hispanic White couples to
Vol. 47, No. 2, 2007

231

accumulate assets during their working years. The
picture that emerges, then, is complicated, because
the absolute loss in income resulting from widowhood can be larger for women whose husbands had
substantial incomes than for women whose husbands made less. If, as is often the case, higher
income results in substantial assets, the widow can
draw upon those to ensure her economic security in
middle through early old ages. Fewer Black and
Hispanic women than non-Hispanic White women
ﬁnd themselves in such a favorable situation.
Consistent with other HRS research (cf. Honig,
2000), our research ﬁnds that this differential
economic vulnerability in late life arises from a set
of factors that operate over the life course to increase
the risk of poverty for minority group women in
later life. These include lower levels of human capital
among minority individuals, less stable employment
in low-wage jobs, low earnings for both husbands
and wives, impaired asset accumulation, and more
frequent marital disruption. Women who have not
had careers or worked in jobs in which they were
able to vest a pension are almost totally dependent
on their husband’s income and on limited community assets. Even if their absolute drop in income is
less than that of more afﬂuent non-Hispanic White

women, with few assets to liquidate or borrow
against, they can end up far worse off ﬁnancially.
The fact that a growing proportion of women,
and especially minority group women, ﬁnd themselves alone and with few economic resources has
important implications for public policy, as well as
for norms concerning paid work and family for
women. Marriage has simply ceased to be the
guarantee of retirement-age security for women
that it might have been in earlier marriage systems.
The clear negative ﬁnancial impact of marital
disruption of all sorts, including widowhood, means
that women must rely more on their own income and
asset accumulation, and public policy must focus
more on individuals and abandon the older malebreadwinner model in which the couple is the focus
of old-age support. As Harrington Meyer (2004, p. 7)
and her colleagues note, with each successive cohort
we can expect ‘‘the proportion of women who will
not be eligible for widow beneﬁts [to increase]
modestly for Whites and Hispanics, but dramatically
for Blacks. The growing race gap in marital rates
means that older Black women will be particularly
unlikely to qualify for these beneﬁts.’’
The result may be greater income inequalities
related to race and ethnicity in the future. Johnson
(1999, p. 6), for example, suggests the following:
Comparisons of the size and composition of assets
held by married couples approaching retirement
in 1992 with those held by couples in 1969 indicate
that wives who become widowed today would
be substantially better off than widows in the past.
The improvement in the economic security of wives
appears to come primarily from increases in
private pensions, conventional assets, and women’s
earnings.

As our data and others show, these privileged widows
are more likely to be non-Hispanic White than
minority group members. As Johnson notes, ﬁnancial
security in old age depends on multiple income
streams. It requires an adequate income and enough
assets with which to purchase long-term care and other
age-based necessities. Given the labor force and
earning disadvantages faced by Black and Hispanic
men and women, these groups will remain at an
elevated risk of inadequate ﬁnancial security in old age.
In the future, racial and Hispanic differences in
income and wealth may be exacerbated by differential marital disruption. Future public policy requires
new research to assess the potential magnitude of the
effect of different types of marital transitions on the
ﬁnancial well-being of older minority women. Many
of these women will reach old age with little income,
no savings or retirement plans, and very few assets.
In such a world, the difference in the ﬁnancial
situation of the advantaged and the disadvantaged
could increase greatly. In addition, future studies
should also examine never married women, because
232

they will comprise an ever greater proportion of
women’s marital status and they are an important
component of understanding Black women’s experiences in particular.

Policy Implications
These data demonstrate clear ﬁnancial vulnerabilities among older minority group women.
Although marriage provides some economic stability, regardless of marital status, Black and Hispanic
women have lower earnings, fewer assets, and less
adequate pension coverage than do non-Hispanic
White women of similar age. In addition, the results
indicate that the situation may be getting worse for
minority women for whom marital disruption is
increasing and for whom marriage has never been
a route to economic security. Given the limited work
opportunities available to many of these women,
their own employment is unlikely to compensate for
the economic weakness of marriage. Few of the
service sector jobs for which they qualify are likely to
provide even minimal beneﬁt packages that include
a retirement plan.
Social Security was based on a male-breadwinner
model that assumes that a woman’s retirement
security would be ensured by marriage (Herd,
2005). As only one pillar of the theoretical retirement
income scheme, Social Security was intended to
supplement private pensions and individual savings
and not serve as the sole source of retirement income
that it has become for many older minority
Americans. The fact that Black and Hispanic men
have faced serious barriers to the accumulation of
assets and have often spent their working years in
jobs with low wages and no retirement plans made
this model less appropriate for minority women,
even prior to the decline in marriage that we have
witnessed in recent decades (Herd, 2006). The
irrelevance of the male-breadwinner model for
many poor women, combined with their own limited
economic opportunities, means that they are highly
vulnerable to poverty in old age (Sevak, Weir, &
Willis, 2003–2004).
Despite its shortcomings in terms of providing an
adequate income, then, Social Security represents the
major income source for a large fraction of poor
women. The centrality of Social Security is made
clearer by the fact that the average woman gains
relatively more than the average male from Social
Security, because the beneﬁt structure favors dependents and low-wage earners, most of whom are
women or children. The evidence we have presented
leads to the conclusion that the male-breadwinner
model of retirement security should be reconsidered,
especially for minority women. Regardless of their
race or ethnicity or even their social class, future
cohorts of working-age women will be forced to take
responsibility for their own welfare and retirement
The Gerontologist

incomes. Some will clearly be in a better position to
do so than others. Increasingly, concerns for a career
and income generation are as relevant for women as
for men. Because of the labor force disadvantages
they face, though, the situation of low-wage service
sector workers and the unemployed and underemployed requires special attention. For these women,
employment will never serve as a route out of poverty or ensure an adequate retirement income. For
this reason, any changes to be made to the present
Social Security system will have to take these
vulnerabilities into account.
The long-term ﬁscal health of the Social Security
system will require some retrenchment, including
higher payroll taxes and reduced beneﬁts. Proposals
aimed at cutting beneﬁts as opposed to generating
revenue would have particularly serious implications
for poor and minority women. For better or worse,
the situation of these women argues for greater
means testing of beneﬁt outlays. Such a move, of
course, runs the risk of transforming Social Security
into more of a welfare program with the potential
stigma that welfare entails. In addition to the
inevitable reforms to Social Security that we will
see in the future, efforts to improve access to private
pensions and increased personal savings and investment by low-wage women employees are clearly
warranted, even if the possibilities remain limited
(Herd, 2005). The partial privatization of Social
Security has been offered as a means of increasing
individual returns and responsibilities. Unfortunately, such reforms would in all likelihood not
improve the old age security of low-wage workers or
those with noncontinuous work histories. The
privatization of Social Security without other reforms to ensure an adequate income to those without
adequate savings would only increase the risk for
minority paid workers. Low-income households,
especially female-headed families, have limited
experience with private investments (Choudhury,
2001–2002). Privatization of Social Security retirement presents additional serious disadvantages for
women, because women tend to be more conservative investors than men and such conservative
choices could easily result in inadequate returns
(Trout, 1997).
What remains clear is that the old-age economic
security of women is greatly affected by race and
Hispanic ethnicity. For many African American and
Hispanic women, restricted employment opportunities and low educational levels make retirement
planning irrelevant, and for many of these women
marriage is no assurance of security. The restricted
earnings capacity of many Black and Hispanic
husbands means that the couple does not have the
opportunity to accumulate assets. In such cases,
when a husband dies he leaves his wife little wealth
and no long-term ﬁnancial security. However, even
for these women the problem is compounded by the
increasing risks associated with different and unVol. 47, No. 2, 2007

233

equal pathways to old age economic security,
including marital disruption earlier in life. Policies
intended to ensure the economic welfare of women
approaching retirement must address persistent
inequities in educational and labor market opportunities associated with race and ethnicity. Toward
that end, research must examine lifelong processes
and challenges associated with economic insecurity
and their cumulative impact by retirement age
(Hatch, 1999).
General reforms to public and private retirement
systems may well increase the choices available to
afﬂuent paid workers, but they are not likely to increase the economic security of low-wage or minority
paid workers. Targeted programs that focus on the
most vulnerable individuals could more directly
address the unique needs of older Black and Hispanic
women, but again, like targeted programs in general,
they run the risk of stigmatizing the recipients and of
generating political opposition. Whatever the future
holds, public policy focused on old age economic
security cannot ignore the complex social and
economic vulnerabilities associated with minority
group status and gender.

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Received May 8, 2006
Accepted November 8, 2006
Decision Editor: Linda S. Noelker, PhD

Endnotes
1. A substantial proportion of elderly widows
(29%) rely on Social Security alone to survive (Weir,
Willis, & Sevak, 2002). In fact, the Social Security
program reduces the percentage of widows in
poverty by more than two thirds, from 62% to
20% (Kijakazi, 2001). Without Social Security, the
total poverty rate among aged beneﬁciaries would be
67% for Blacks and 47% for Whites (Social Security
Administration, 2002). Social Security accounts for
almost two thirds of total retirement income among
Black and Hispanic elderly couples (Kijakazi). As
a result of these cumulative disadvantages, approximately 39.8% of Black and 32.6% of Hispanic
women over the age of 65 receive incomes of less
than 125% of poverty level in 2004 (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2004).
2. Among this group, ethnic differences were
apparent in cases lost to follow-up or mortality, with
non-Hispanic White women reporting somewhat
lower household income, but higher household
assets, than those non-Hispanic White women who
remained in the sample. The opposite is true of
Hispanic women—those who did not participate
in the survey in 2000 had slightly higher income
but signiﬁcantly lower household assets than those
Hispanic women who were not lost to attrition or
mortality. However, non-Hispanic Black women not
interviewed in 2000 had both lower income and total
household assets.
3. The HRS oversampled Florida residents, because of the Congressional Appropriation language
for the study, which speciﬁed that special attention
be given in the HRS to areas with ‘‘high densities
and numbers of older populations’’ (Health and
Retirement Study, 2002).
The Gerontologist

