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@zeynalig zeynalig on 26 Apr 2017 13 KB initialisation des corpus
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		<p>As a public member of the United States delegation to the Rome conference 1 , I am
			deeply<lb/> disappointed that the text of the Statute that was issued by the Chairman on
			July 17, 1998<lb/> contained jurisdictional provisions that the United States could not
			accept. After five<lb/> weeks of intense effort at the conference, and years of
			preparatory work before then, the<lb/> delegation had great and justifiable pride in its
			contributions to crafting the Statute. The<lb/> United States&apos; commitment to
			creating an effective International Criminal Court ( &quot; ICC &quot; )<lb/> could not
			reasonably be doubted, and to have come so close and failed is a profound loss,<lb/> for
			the United States as well as for the court.<lb/></p>
		
		<p>As a feminist, my own particular focus at the Rome conference was on the provisions<lb/>
			that affect prosecution of crimes against women. As a former prosecutor in The Hague,
			I<lb/> was also concerned with procedural and other provisions that might ensure that
			the court<lb/> would be more than a symbolic institution, that it would actually work.
			It is those provi-<lb/>sions that are the subject of this paper.<lb/></p>
		
		<head>Wartime Violence Against Women<lb/></head>
		
		<p>Surely no reminder is needed that for centuries women have been victims of sexual
			assault<lb/> in times of armed conflict, and that their attackers have rarely been
			effectively prosecuted. 2<lb/> Even at Nuremberg, where rape was enumerated in the
			charter as a crime against human-<lb/>ity, evidence of rape was presented but was not
			itself the subject of separate charges or<lb/> noted in the judgments. 3 Except for the
			less well-known proceedings at Tokyo, the handful<lb/> of other prosecutions of World
			War II war crimes have been similarly unconcerned about<lb/> sexual assault.<lb/></p>
		
		<p>This lack of concern ended in 1992. Reporters of the conflict in Bosnia wrote
			repeat-<lb/>edly about widespread sexual assaults that appeared to reflect deliberate
			policy. 4 When the<lb/> United Nations Security Council established the International
			Criminal Tribunal for the<lb/> Former Yugoslavia, it made clear its concern about the
			reported sexual assaults 5 , even<lb/> though the substantive law set forth in the
			Statute it promulgated contained only one pro-<lb/>vision regarding sexual assault. 6
			The Office of the Prosecutor at the Tribunal made creative<lb/> use of the Statute, for
			example charging rapes as criminal conduct under the grave breach<lb/> provisions of the
			Geneva Conventions that prohibit torture and inhuman treatment. 7 The<lb/> Rwanda
			Tribunal displayed similar willingness to fit crimes of sexual assault within
			tradi-<lb/>tional categories, and in one of its first judgments a trial chamber based a
			conviction for<lb/> genocide in part on the accused&apos;s having directed others to
			commit rapes. 8 Equally signifi-<lb/>cant for the effective prosecution of crimes
			against women, both ad hoc tribunals have<lb/> women among their judges and in senior
			positions in their prosecutor&apos;s offices, although<lb/> not in numbers that approach
			equality with men. 9<lb/></p>
		
		<p>The ICC Statute is much more explicit. Regarding selection of the 18 judges, the
			States<lb/> Parties are required to take into account the need within the membership of
			the Court,<lb/> among other things, for a fair representation of female and male judges,
			and for judges<lb/> with legal expertise about violence against women. 10 In selecting
			staff, the Prosecutor and<lb/> Registrar are required to have regard for the same
			considerations. 11 The Prosecutor is<lb/> required to appoint an adviser with legal
			expertise about sexual and gender violence. 12<lb/> During the course of investigations
			the Prosecutor is further required to respect the inter-<lb/>ests and personal
			circumstances of victims and witnesses, including their gender, and to<lb/> take into
			particular account crimes of sexual or gender violence. 13 All parts of the court
			are<lb/> required to take measures to protect witnesses, particularly where the crime
			involves sex-<lb/>ual or gender violence. 14 The registrar is required to set up a
			victims and witnesses unit to<lb/> assist witnesses, and to include on the staff persons
			with expertise in trauma related to<lb/> crimes of sexual violence. 15<lb/></p>
		
		<p>Taken together, these provisions leave no doubt that the ICC has a mandate to
			prose-<lb/>cute crimes of sexual violence. 16 Systemically, every aspect of the
			composition of the court<lb/> is designed to enhance the likelihood that those crimes
			will be given the attention they<lb/> deserve. This is indeed a major step
			forward.<lb/></p>
		
		<p>In the substantive parts of the ICC Statute that set forth the particular crimes that
			will<lb/> be within the ICC&apos;s jurisdiction, the Rome conference in many respects
			stayed close to the<lb/> language traditionally used to describe the acts that
			constitute the three categories of core<lb/> crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity
			and war crimes. At the same time, the confer-<lb/>ence was innovative in giving
			expression to certain principles the delegates considered as<lb/> established.
			17<lb/></p>
		
		<p>Pursuant to this approach, crimes of sexual violence are set forth explicitly. The
			acts<lb/> constituting crimes against humanity include &quot; rape, sexual slavery,
			enforced prostitution,<lb/> forced pregnancy 18 , enforced sterilization, or any other
			form of sexual violence of compa-<lb/>rable gravity, &quot; 19 as well as persecution
			against any identifiable group on grounds, among<lb/> others, of gender. 20 War crimes
			include &quot; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced<lb/> pregnancy,
			enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting [in<lb/>
			the context of international armed conflicts] a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions
			&quot;<lb/> or, [in the context of internal armed conflicts] &quot; constituting a
			serious violation of article 3<lb/> common to the four Geneva Conventions. &quot; 21 To
			the extent creation of an accurate histori-<lb/>cal record and bringing repose for
			victims by public acknowledgment of their suffering is a<lb/> purpose of the ICC, the
			ability of the prosecution to bring sexual assault charges under<lb/> these specific
			provisions, rather than the more generic torture and inhuman treatment<lb/> provisions,
			is also a major step forward.<lb/></p>
		
		<p>Several other provisions of the ICC Statute enhance the likelihood that crimes of
			vio-<lb/>lence against women will be effectively prosecuted. Crimes against humanity and
			war<lb/> crimes are not limited to the context of international armed conflict. 22 Since
			internal con-<lb/>flicts are increasingly frequent, and since violence against women is
			surely as prevalent in<lb/> internal as in international conflicts, this provision alone
			has great importance. And the<lb/> ICC is prohibited from making any adverse distinction
			based on gender, among other cat-<lb/>egories, in the application and interpretation of
			law. 23<lb/></p>
		
		<head>Procedure<lb/></head>
		
		<p>The Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal treated procedural issues in a handful of general
			arti-<lb/>cles, and left it to the Tribunal judges to develop detailed rules of
			procedure and evi-<lb/>dence. 24 The judges have revised and refined the rules they
			first promulgated, to reflect the<lb/> particular issues they have encountered and
			comments received from interested parties. 25<lb/> The Rome conference adopted a
			different approach, setting forth detailed procedural pro-<lb/>visions for the ICC in
			the Statute itself. 26 Remaining details will be covered in Rules of Pro-<lb/> cedure
			and Evidence, which will be negotiated at the Preparatory Commission to be<lb/>
			established by the United Nations General Assembly, and adopted by a two-thirds
			major-<lb/>ity of the Assembly of States Parties. 27<lb/></p>
		
		<p>In general, the procedural provisions reflect a mixture of the continental and
			common<lb/> law criminal justice systems. For example, investigations are conducted and
			prosecutions<lb/> pursued by the prosecutor, as in common law systems, but a pre-trial
			chamber of judges<lb/> has considerable supervisory authority, as in many continental
			law systems. 28 Where their<lb/> personal interests are affected, victims or their
			representatives may present their views, at<lb/> stages of the proceedings determined by
			the Court, a feature of many continental sys-<lb/>tems. 29<lb/></p>
		
		<p>The procedural provisions themselves are a remarkable accomplishment. From
			inves-<lb/>tigation through enforcement of sentence, a series of comprehensive articles
			sets forth<lb/> steps of a criminal prosecution. These provisions should provide a solid
			foundation for<lb/> the court to do its work. Because these provisions, including those
			regarding such impor-<lb/>tant and sensitive issues as protection of national security
			information 30 and cooperation<lb/> of States parties 31 were negotiated, rather than
			promulgated, States may be more likely to<lb/> support and offer real cooperation to the
			court.<lb/></p>
		
		<head>Problems<lb/></head>
		
		<p>Despite the great achievements of the Rome conference, problems remain, and the
			Statute<lb/> is far from perfect. Regarding the jurisdictional issues that concern the
			United States, the<lb/> Preparatory Commission may yet be able to make adjustments that
			would resolve those<lb/> concerns. Other defects may have to wait for correction until
			seven years after the Statute<lb/> comes into force, 32 if then.<lb/></p>
		
		<p>For example, the trial chambers&apos; judgments need not be unanimous. A judgment of<lb/>
			conviction may be pronounced by two of the three judges who will comprise each
			trial<lb/> chamber. 33 In effect this entrusts power to determine the verdict, based on
			such factual<lb/> bases as assessment of witness credibility and analysis of the
			evidence, to just one person,<lb/> the judge with the swing vote. Unlike questions of
			law about which judges frequently disa-<lb/>gree without affecting public confidence in
			their conclusions, failure to agree about the<lb/> factual bases for its judgments may
			serve to undermine confidence in the ICC. This may<lb/> have profound consequences in
			the context of the highly contested evidence that will be<lb/> presented in the high
			profile cases that are expected to be before the court. It would have<lb/> been far more
			effective, although more expensive, to provide for five judges in each trial<lb/>
			chamber, and require agreement of at least four of the five judges for
			conviction.<lb/></p>
		
		<p>In defining criminal responsibility, the Rome conference failed to provide criminal<lb/>
			responsibility for inciting others to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes,
			in<lb/> effect shielding disseminators of violence-inspiring propaganda from
			prosecution. 34 Since<lb/> those responsible for such incitement may truly be among the
			most culpable, for example<lb/> for persuading neighbors to commit terrible crimes
			against one another, 35 this omission is<lb/> a significant limitation on the
			court&apos;s ability to address the most significant crimes.<lb/></p>
		
		<p>Despite these, and other, failings, the ICC Statute is a remarkable
			accomplishment.<lb/></p> 
		
		34. Consistent with the terms of the Genocide Convention,
		direct and public incitement to genocide is<lb/> punishable by the ICC. Article
		25(3)(e).<lb/> 35. The Statutes of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals do provide for criminal
		responsibility for instigat-<lb/>ing others to commit the underlying crimes. See Yugoslav
		Tribunal Article 7(1). In the Nahimana case, the<lb/> Rwanda Tribunal has charged persons
		responsible for radio broadcasting of exhortations to kill Tutsis with<lb/> instigation to
		commit crimes against humanity. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, ICTR No. 96-11-T. For the ICC,<lb/>
		any general incitement provision would have to be precisely framed to avoid infringing on
		rights to free-<lb/>dom of expression.<lb/> The Making of a Gender-Sensitive
		International<lb/> Criminal Court<lb/> VALERIE OOSTERVELD*<lb/> The International Criminal
		Court (ICC) Statute incorporates significant advances in the<lb/> prosecution of crimes of
		sexual violence, and crimes against women in armed conflict<lb/> more generally. It was not
		easy to ensure that the Statute reflected the evolution of interna-<lb/>tional humanitarian
		law with respect to women, but it was extremely important. Crimes<lb/> committed against
		women in war are traditionally underprosecuted. The International<lb/> Criminal Tribunals
		for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are slowly reversing the histor-<lb/>ical invisibility,
		and their decisions provided the basis for ensuring that past mistakes were<lb/> not
		repeated in the ICC Statute.<lb/> In 1994, the International Law Commission presented a
		final draft ICC Statute to the<lb/> United Nations General Assembly. 1 This draft was
		subsequently used as the basis for dis-<lb/>cussions and negotiations at the 1995 ad hoc
		committee meetings, and at the 1996, 1997<lb/> and 1998 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)
		meetings. By the February 1997 PrepCom,<lb/> nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had become
		concerned that the draft Statute did 
	
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