Uhlenberg, P. (2009). Children in an aging society. Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences, 64B(4), 489–496, doi:10.1093/geronb/gbp001. Advance Access publication on February 25, 2009.

Children in an Aging Society
Peter Uhlenberg
Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Objectives. This article explores ways in which population aging in the United States between 2010 and 2030 might
impact the well-being of children, with a distinction made between advantaged and disadvantaged children.
Methods. A variety of economic and demographic statistics are used to describe the changing age structure of the
population and changing public spending on older people and children. Data from the 1985 General Social Survey and
Wave 2 of the National Survey of Families and Households are also used to examine connections between older people
and children.
Results. In recent decades, there has been a graying of the federal budget, and programs for children have received a
declining proportion of domestic spending. These trends will be exaggerated between 2010 and 2030 unless structural
changes occur. Grandparents may provide increasing resources for their grandchildren. Age segregation results in relatively few older people being directly involved with children not related to them by kinship.
Conclusions. The implications of population aging for children are relevant primarily for disadvantaged children.
Disadvantaged children have grandparents with fewest resources and are most in need of public spending. As costs of
supporting the older population increase, intentional social changes will be needed to prevent growing inequality among
children.
Key Words: Age segregation—Child well-being—Grandparents—Population aging—Welfare state.

T

HE proportion old in the U.S. population will increase
rapidly as the baby boom cohorts pass age 65 between
2010 and 2030. Anticipating this aging of the population, a
great deal of attention is now focused on questions related
to how well the needs of old people will be met. There
seems to be no end to the literature dealing with the challenges of meeting the income, health care, and caregiving
needs of the burgeoning population of older people. Although less discussed, population aging also is likely to
have significant implications for children and their wellbeing. In this article, I begin to explore how changes in the
size and composition of the older population between 2010
and 2030 in the United States may be connected to the experience of children.
The article is divided into five parts. The first two sections provide a necessary background for examining the
implications of population aging for children over the next
several decades. First, a demographic perspective on changing age distributions is provided. As the proportion of the
population older than 65 years increases from 13% to 19%
over the two decades following 2010, how will the proportion under age 20 change? The second section draws attention to the large and growing inequality among children in
the United States: the gap between most privileged and least
privileged children. The implications of population aging
for children are not uniform across these different segments
of the child population. The remainder of the article considers three possible ways in which population aging could be
connected to the experience of children. These connections
involve state resources available for investment in children,

grandparent resources available to children, and involvement of older people in directly meeting needs of children
not related to them by kinship.

Demography of Age Composition
The long-term change in population age distribution as a
society experiences the demographic transition is quite
straightforward. When a population has sustained high fertility and high mortality for a long period of time, it will
have a large proportion of children and a small proportion
of old people. Correspondingly, when a population has sustained low fertility and low mortality for a long period of
time, it will have a much smaller proportion of children and
a much larger proportion of old people. Using stable population models, the magnitude of this shift in age composition can be seen. (A stable population shows the age
distribution that would ultimately result if age-specific reproduction and mortality rates were unchanging over time.
It can be determined by specifying life expectancy and the
gross reproduction rate [GRR], which is the average number of daughters that women would have by the end of their
reproductive careers if, at each age, they experienced the
fertility rates of a particular period. The statistics that follow
are from the stable female population data available in Coale
& Demeny, 1983.) In a stable population with relatively
high mortality and fertility (a life expectancy of 40 and a
GRR of 2.5), 47% of the population is younger than 20 and
4% is older than 65 years (p. 88). In a stable population with
relatively low mortality and fertility (a life expectancy of 80

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489

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Figure 1. Age composition of the U.S. population, 1970–2030.

and a GRR of 1.0), 25% of the population is younger than
20 and 20% is older than 65 years (p. 104). This dramatic
shift in the relative size of the older and younger populations is primarily a consequence of changing fertility rates
(Goldstein, 2009). Note that the change in the relative size
of the population aged 20–64 (an increase of 6%, from 49%
to 55%) is much less than the decrease in proportion young
(22%) or the increase in proportion old (16%).
Although the long-term effect of a rapid drop in fertility
is a decrease in percent of children that approximately
equals the increase in percent old, the timing is different
for shifts in relative sizes of these two age categories. Most
of the decline in the proportion young in the population
occurs within the first two decades following a fertility decline, whereas most of the change in percent old is not
experienced until several decades later. Thus, for several
decades after fertility drops, the youth dependency ratio
(population <20/population 20–64) will decline without
any significant increase in the old age dependency ratio
(population 65+/population 20–64). Consequently, during
this phase a decline occurs in the total dependency ratio
(youth dependency ratio plus old age dependency ratio).
Other things being equal, this temporary drop in the total
dependency ratio, referred to as a “demographic dividend,”
allows more resources to be invested rather than consumed. Later, however, as the old age dependency ratio
increases, the total dependency ratio returns to a level similar to the one existing before the fertility decline. Those
who question whether population aging creates any economic challenge to a society often call attention to the fact
that total dependency ratios may be no higher in an old
population than in a young one. The higher old age dependency ratio in the old population is offset by a lower youth
dependency ratio.
Of course the U.S. population was not stable in 1970,
nor has it been stable since then. However, because fertility essentially leveled off after falling sharply in the 1960s,
the general dynamics of changing age distributions following a drop in fertility previously described help us to

understand changes in the age composition of the U.S.
population between 1970 and 2030. The total fertility rate
(TFR) in the United States dropped abruptly after the baby
boom, going from 3.7 in 1960 to 2.0 in 1973 (National
Center for Health Statistics [NCHS], 2008), and then it
remained relatively stable thereafter. (The TFR indicates
the average number of children that women who survive to
the end of their reproductive careers would have if they
experienced, at each age, the fertility rate existing at a particular period.) Figure 1 shows how the age distribution of
the U.S. population changed in the years following the
rapid fertility decline that occurred in the 1960s. Between
1970 and 1990, the proportion of the population younger
than 20 years declined by 9.2% (from 37.9% to 28.7%),
whereas the proportion aged 65 and older increased by
only 2.7% (from 9.9% to 12.6%). Reflecting these changes,
the total dependency ratio fell from 0.92 to 0.70 between
1970 and 1990. After only modest changes in the age distribution between 1990 and 2010, there will be a rapid increase in the proportion older than 65 years between 2010
and 2030 (from 13.0% to 19.3%). As the population ages
over these two decades, the proportion younger than 20
years will change by less than 1% (from 27.1% to 26.2%).
As a result of these changes, the total dependency ratio,
which was 0.67 in 2010, is projected to increase up to 0.83
by 2030. The demographic dividend resulting from the
fertility decline of the 1960s will essentially be eliminated
as the population ages rapidly.

Increasing Inequality Among Children
As fertility declined in the 1960s, American families on
average had fewer children. But other large changes in the
family also occurred after the 1960s, and these changes
have significant implications for children. Two widely recognized changes were the increasing proportion of children
born to unmarried mothers and the increasing proportion of
children experiencing the divorce of their parents. The proportion of children born to unmarried mothers steadily increased from about 5% in 1960 to 37% in 2005 (J. A. Martin
et al., 2007; Ventura & Bachrach, 2000). The proportion of
children experiencing their parents’ divorce increased rapidly from 7.2 per 1,000 in 1960 to 16.8 per 1,000 in 1990
(Clarke, 1995) but probably has not increased since then.
(National data on the number of children experiencing their
parents’ divorce are not available after 1990, but divorce
rates have not increased since that date.) As a result of these
changes, the proportion of children living with two parents
declined from 88% in 1960 to 67% in 2007 (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2008). This
change in family structure significantly increased the proportion of children at risk of living in families with limited
resources. Risk of economic deprivation is much greater for
children in one-parent families—poverty rates for children
in mother-only families in 2007 were 42%, compared with

CHILDREN IN AN AGING SOCIETY

8% for those living with two married parents (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2008). In addition, parental time investment in the care and supervision
of children tends to be less in one-parent families compared
with two-parent families (McLanahan & Percheski, 2008).
In an insightful article, McLanahan (2004) extends our
understanding of the growing disparity in children’s resources by focusing on differing education levels of mothers.
Part of the growing inequality related to mother’s education
is a result of the different trends in premarital childbearing
and divorce among women with differing educational
backgrounds. A recent study of children born in two different cohorts (1970–1974 and 1990–1994) illustrates the
divergence in family structure experienced by those born
to well-educated mothers versus low-educated mothers
(Martin, 2004). Among children born to mothers who
completed 4 years of college, the proportion whose mothers
were married at the time of their birth and did not divorce
over the next 10 years increased from 70% to 76% across
these cohorts. In contrast, the proportion of children born
to non-college-educated mothers who were married and
remained married for 10 years declined from 53% to
42%.
But other changes related to mother’s education are also
relevant to the growing gap between most privileged and
least privileged children. Because of increasing educational
attainment of women (DiPrete & Buchmann, 2006), increasing marital homogamy (Schwartz & Mare, 2005), and
increasing employment of mothers (McLanahan, 2004), a
growing proportion of children since 1970 have lived in
families with well-educated mothers, few siblings, and high
incomes resulting from two parents working at high-paying
jobs. Meanwhile, children born to low-educated mothers
have made little progress, as they are likely to live either in
two-parent families where neither parent has a high-paying
job or, increasingly, in single-parent families with low income. The actual increasing economic disparity of children
over time can be seen from statistics in the Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics (2008), which
track children from 1980 to 2006. These data show that the
proportion of children living in families below the poverty
line in 2006 (17%) was about the same as it had been in
1980 (17.3%). However, the proportion of children in
wealthy families (defined as family income more than 600%
of poverty) tripled—from 4.3% in 1980 to 13.8% in 2006.
Correspondingly, the proportion of children in mediumincome families (between 200% and 400% of poverty)
declined from 41.1% to 31.6%.
Thus, an increasing proportion of children experience the
multiple advantages of growing up in stable families with
two highly educated parents and very high incomes. In contrast is the large proportion of children who grow up with
the multiple disadvantages of living in poverty with a single
low-educated parent. The significance of this growing division of children between the “haves” and the “have-nots”

491

should not be underestimated. The discussion that follows
examines how the changes in the older population between
2010 and 2030 will differentially affect the most privileged
and least privileged children in the United States and thereby
further exacerbate the growing divide among children.

Population Aging, Children, and the Welfare
State
A first possible connection between population aging and
the well-being of children relates to the increasing cost to
the welfare state of supporting a growing dependent older
population. The costs of supporting an increasing number
of older people could challenge efforts to increase, or even
maintain, the level of state resources that are invested in
children (in things like child care, income security, social
services, education, and health care). Focusing on how the
domestic spending portion of the federal budget (the budget
minus defense, homeland security, and international affairs)
is allocated provides evidence of how various programs
competing for domestic priority have fared recently. Between 1960 and 2007, the domestic portion of the federal
budget grew rapidly, both in absolute size and as a percent
of gross domestic product, as government programs proliferated. As previously noted, this expansion of government spending was aided by the demographic dividend
provided by the rapid drop in fertility. During this period,
spending on children’s programs grew but at a slower pace
than total domestic spending and at a far slower pace than
spending on programs for the older population. Consequently, the three largest programs for older people (nonchild parts of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid)
grew from 22% of the domestic budget in 1960 to 46% in
2006 (Carasso, Steuerle, Reynolds, Vericker, & Macomber,
2008). In contrast, all federal spending on children declined
from 20.2% of domestic spending in 1960 to 16.2% in 2007
(Carasso et al., 2008).
If current arrangements persist, projections of federal
spending to the year 2018 suggest that the declining priority
of children in the federal budget will continue. These projections show that by 2018, programs for children will be
just 13.8% of the domestic budget, whereas the portion going to older adults will increase to 59.2% (Carasso et al.,
2008). And, of course, the proportion committed to older
adults would then continue to increase over the following
decade as the proportion old in the population continues to
increase rapidly until 2030. The relevance of the impressive
growth in spending on the older population compared with
that on children is simply that as an increasing proportion of
public spending goes to older people, a decreasing proportion is available for all other programs. Recognizing the
challenges created by the graying of the federal budget for
funding children’s programs does not, of course, mean that
older people are receiving too much or that children must
receive too little.

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Table 1. Ratio of Population in the Labor Force (LF) to Population
Younger Than 20 and Older Than 65 Years, 2000–2030
Year

LF/Pop. <20

LF/Pop. 65+

LF/Pop.<20 + Pop. 65+

2000
2010
2020
2030

1.8
1.9
1.8
1.7

4.0
3.9
3.0
2.4

1.2
1.3
1.1
1.0

Note: Sources—U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division (2008) and
Toossi (2002).

In a provocative article, Preston (1984) noted that whereas
poverty rates for older Americans declined rapidly between
1970 and 1984, poverty rates for children increased substantially. These divergent trends in poverty occurred as
government spending on older people grew much more rapidly than spending on children. This finding led to an argument that programs for the old were growing at the expense
of programs for the young. Other economists (Kotlikoff,
1992; Thurow, 1996) have further explored future implications of the expanding claims of the older population on the
federal budget. The suggestion of a growing competition
between young and old for public support generated a
heated political debate over “generational equity.” Is the increased spending on the older population that accompanies
population aging creating conflict between age groups? And
is conflict between age groups for scarce resources likely to
escalate as baby boom cohorts enter old age? A number of
social scientists have effectively responded to these questions by arguing that political conflict between age groups
has not developed and is unlikely to develop in the future
(Hamil-Luker, 2001; Quadagno, 1989; Schulz & Binstock,
2008; Street & Cossman, 2006; Williamson, Watts-Roy, &
Kingson, 1999). Further, the literature that is critical of the
generational equity hypothesis points out that increasing
spending on the old does not require less spending on children. Indeed, an international comparison of different developed countries found that high levels of public spending
on older people was positively associated with high levels
of spending on children (Pampel, 1994). Thus, it does not appear that generational conflict is a necessary consequence of
population aging.
Nevertheless, it is clear that social spending has developed in such a way that the gap in government spending on
older people and children is now huge, and this gap is continuing to increase. The Congressional Budget Office (2008)
estimates that average federal spending per person older
than 65 years in 2010 will be $21,000 (in 2000 dollars),
compared with $3,000 per child. If spending from all levels
of government, rather than just the federal level, is considered, the ratio of per capita spending on older people compared with children is reduced, but only from 7:1 to about
3:1 (Pati, Keren, Alessaandrini, & Schwarz, 2004). The
point is that the discrepancy in per capita public spending
on children and old people in the United States cannot
be ignored when considering the shifting budget priorities

related to population aging. The aging of the population between 2010 and 2030 will significantly increase government
spending on the entitlement programs for older people.
Over these 20 years, there is no reason to expect that needs
of children will decrease—the proportion of the population
who are children will decline by less than 1%. Potentially
taxes could increase, or other shifts in the budget could occur that would permit increasing spending on children at the
same time that spending on older people is increasing. But
the emerging political challenges of balancing competing
demands for the shrinking proportion of the domestic budget not going to support old age programs should not be
ignored.
As previously noted, the demographic dividend created
by the decline in birth rates in the 1960s is ending, and the
total dependency ratio will increase between 2010 and 2030.
Because all the increase in the dependency ratio is created
by the growing old age dependency ratio, the economic significance of the demographic change is amplified.
Actually, dependency ratios that use simple age composition statistics are not the best way to measure support available to dependents in a population because labor force
participation rates of the adult population can change.
Rather, it is preferable to look directly at the ratio of people
in the labor force to the size of the child and older population. Using projections of the labor force and population,
data in Table 1 indicate changes in the ratio of workers to
children and old people in coming decades. As is well
known, the number of people in the labor force per person
older than 65 years will drop precipitously between 2010
and 2030—from 3.9 to 2.4. But during these decades, the
number in the labor force per person younger than 20 years
also declines—from 1.9 to 1.7. Consequently, looking
ahead, the growing burden on the working population to
support an aging population will not be mitigated by any
decline in the burden to support children.
In the United States, parents are expected to be the primary source of support for children and there is widespread
opposition to the idea of societal responsibility for bearing
the cost of childrearing. That is the reason why per capita
government spending on children is relatively low compared
with spending on older people. Compared with other welfare
states, collective responsibility for the cost of raising children in the United States is quite limited (Lundberg, Aberg,
Kolegard, Bjork, & Fritzell, 2008; Osberg, Smeeding, &
Schwabish, 2004). Thus, in the United States the abundance
enjoyed by children in privileged families stands in contrast
to children in the least privileged families who rely primarily on the resources of their economically disadvantaged
and stressed parents. Thus, if there is a declining priority for
children’s programs in public spending, the impact will be
experienced precisely by those children who are most vulnerable and dependent on public support. Although the
growing cost of supporting the older population in coming
decades does not require declining public support for poor

CHILDREN IN AN AGING SOCIETY

children, the political implications of a graying federal budget raises concerns. Almost certainly, this change in the
budget will increase the political challenge of adequately
responding to the needs of disadvantaged children.

Grandparents’ Contribution to Grandchildren
The negative implications of the graying federal budget
for the well-being of children should be balanced by assessing the potential for increasing positive direct contributions
from older people to children. The clearest way in which
older people directly contribute to the well-being of children operates through kinship ties, and these are considered
first. Changes in fertility and mortality that are responsible
for population aging have affected opportunities for grandparents to play a significant role in the lives of children.
Mortality declines have the obvious effect of increasing the
supply of living grandparents for children. I have estimated
that under mortality conditions existing in 1960, only about
23% of children aged 10 would have all four biological
grandparents still living (Uhlenberg, 2005). As death rates
in later life have declined, the number of living grandparents for children has increased, and by 2020 almost half of
all 10-year-olds are expected to have all grandparents alive.
Indeed, we anticipate that 80% of those reaching age 30 in
2020 will still have at least one living grandparent.
The decline in fertility that leads to population aging also
increases opportunities for living grandparents to make
large investments in their grandchildren. As family size decreases, children have fewer siblings who compete for the
attention and resources of their grandparents. About 60% of
the children born to baby boom families in the 1950s had
three or more siblings: Only 30% of the children born after
1980 grew up in such large families (Uhlenberg, 2005).
When low fertility persists over several generations, there is
an additional reduction in competition for grandparents.
Children born to parents who have few siblings have few
sets of cousins who share the same grandparents. The proportion of children who have four or more sets of cousins
competing for the attention of a particular grandparent is
estimated to have declined from 50% in 1950 to 25% in
2000 (Uhlenberg, 2005). The trend toward fewer grandchildren per grandparent will continue as the baby boom cohorts enter old age; by 2020, a majority of children will
have no more than one set of cousins linked to a particular
grandparent and only 20% of grandparents will have more
than two sets of grandchildren.
There are other obvious ways in which grandparents’ resources have increased since 1960, and these are likely to
continue to increase in coming decades as the proportion
old in the population increases. Not only do children have
more grandparents alive but also their grandparents are
wealthier and healthier than in the past. The trend toward
increasing economic resources of people approaching old
age is expected to continue as baby boomers retire (Butrica,

493

Iams, & Smith, 2004). Similarly, the trend toward lower disability rates among the young-old population is expected to
continue (Manton, Gu, & Lamb, 2006). Further, most grandparents older than 65 years are now retired, giving them
time to spend with grandchildren. Despite increasing rates
of labor force participation by the older population in recent
years, less than one-third of those aged 65–69 years were in
the labor force in 2005 (Copeland, 2007). Thus, from the
perspective of children in general, there has been an increasing likelihood of having multiple grandparents who have
valuable resources (money, health, time). And children have
fewer siblings and cousins with whom they share these
grandparents. These patterns suggest that population aging
between 2010 and 2030 might be associated with increasing
direct contributions of older people to their grandchildren.
However, this happy scenario of increasing opportunities
for grandparents to invest in the lives of children is not realized by many children because the opportunities are spread
unevenly. As discussed earlier, there is a growing disparity
between most advantaged and least advantaged children.
Because the connection between children and grandparents
tends to be mediated by the middle generation, it is children
in the most advantaged families who gain most from the
increasing resources of older people. Children in singleparent families and those with less educated mothers are
much less likely than children living in more advantaged
families to have multiple grandparents with resources to
make significant intergenerational contributions. This does
not mean, of course, that grandparents with limited resources do not make important contributions to their
grandchildren (Minkler & Fuller-Thomson, 2005). Indeed,
older women in poorer health are more likely than other
women to become custodial grandparents (Hughes, Waite,
LaPierre, & Luo, 2007). But the point is that disadvantaged
children are disproportionately linked to grandparents who
are relatively disadvantaged.
The extent of inequality of grandparent resources for advantaged compared with disadvantaged children can be
seen from data collected by the National Survey of Families
and Households (see http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh/). Statistics in Table 2 show maternal grandparent characteristics
for most advantaged children (living with two married parents, mother with a college education, and household income in the upper quartile) compared with least advantaged
children (living with one parent, mother with less than a
college education, and household income in the lowest
quartile). The same proportion of all children (12%) was in
the least advantaged as in the most advantaged category.
Compared with the most advantaged children, the least advantaged were twice as likely to have maternal grandparents
who had economic concerns, were in poor health, or had 10
or more grandchildren (Table 2). Further, grandparents of
disadvantaged children were much more likely to have
limited education and to be unmarried. The most advantaged children tend to have access to abundant grandparent

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Table 2. Percent of Grandparents With Selected Characteristics, by
Child’s Family Advantage
Grandparents Characteristicsb
Child’s Familya
Most advantaged
Least advantaged

Not Married
35.5
53.6

Poor
$ Concerns Health
31.8
59.8

20.0
40.2

Low
Education 10+ GC
44.5
80.2

23.6
40.2

Notes: Source—calculated from the National Survey of Families and
Households Wave 2. GC = grandparents characteristics.
a Most advantaged: mother married, mother college educated, and household income in top quartile; least advantaged: mother unmarried, mother less
than college educated, and household income in lowest quartile.
b Not married: marital status is “not married”; $ concerns: worry about family income “once in awhile” or more often; poor health: describe health as “fair,”
“poor,” or “very poor”; low education: completed high school or less; and 10+
GC: 10 or more grandchildren.

resources, which are somewhat “socially redundant”
because these children already have generous family resources (Elder & Conger, 2000). In contrast, the least advantaged children have access to severely limited
grandparent resources. Because children with the greatest
need are linked to grandparents who are most likely to be
divorced and to have poor health, low education, and low
income, they are likely to benefit little if at all from the anticipated overall increase in resources of grandparents in
coming decades.
Older People’s Involvement With Nonkin
Children
Although the primary way in which older people directly
contribute to the well-being of children is through the grandparent–grandchild connection, it also is possible for older
people to assist children who are not their kin. Through involvement in volunteer programs, older people have the potential to improve the welfare of children and to improve
their own well-being (Morrow-Howell, Hinterlong, Rozario,
& Tang, 2003). For example, evaluations of the Foster
Grandparent Program, which matches people older than
60 years with disadvantaged children, report positive outcomes for the children involved (Senior Corps, 2008). But
this program involves only about 1 in 1,500 older adults. A
variety of other intergenerational programs have been found
to benefit both older people and needy children, but there is
no evidence that these volunteer programs involve more than
a tiny fraction of older adults (Newman, Ward, Smith,
Wilson, & McCrea, 1997). We lack detailed data showing
how many older people interact with children not related to
them by kinship, how much time they spend with nonkin
children, what the interaction involves, and what difference
it makes to children and to old people. However, there is
evidence of pervasive age segregation in American society
(Hagestad & Uhlenberg, 2005), suggesting that overall there
is little interaction between children and nonkin older people.
One indication of the extent of age segregation in the
United States comes from analyzing data collected in the

Table 3. Percent Age Distribution of Nonkin Network Members, by
Respondents’ Age
Respondents
Aged
18–39
40–49
50–59
60–69
70+

Percent of Network Members in Age Category
18–39

40–49

50–59

60–69

70+

79.6
35.9
21.8
6.5
4.9

13.6
44.4
25.6
13.4
12.2

5.2
15.3
38.6
26.4
24.4

1.6
4.4
13.0
41.2
24.4

0.1
0.0
1.0
12.5
34.1

Note: Source—calculated from the 1985 General Social Survey.

1985 General Social Survey that asked adult respondents to
identify up to five other adults with whom they had discussed important matters over the past 6 months (see Burt,
1985). I have calculated the age distribution of the individuals identified as nonkin members of the personal networks
for individuals of different ages. The extent of age segregation of nonkin network members is shown by data in Table 3.
For every age category, the largest proportion of network
members is in the same age category occupied by the respondent (indicated by the percents in the diagonal). Fewer
than 2% of the nonkin network members of persons aged
18–39 were older than 60 years. (And no one younger than
30 years selected anyone older than 70 years as a network
member.) Reciprocally, fewer than 7% of the network members selected by respondents older than 60 years were
younger than 40 years. (And no one older than 70 years
identified anyone younger than 30 years as a network member). Although this survey asked respondents to identify
only adult members of their personal networks, it seems unlikely that older people would have identified any nonkin
children if that had been permitted.
Additional evidence of age segregation of children
from nonkin old people is seen from the age composition
of the adults involved with children in the dominant nonfamily settings. Only 3% of all teachers of children in
kindergarten through eighth grade are older than 60
years, and only 3% of day care workers are older than 65
years (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2005).
Similarly, older people are rarely the coaches of recreation league sports teams, the counselors at children’s
camps, or the pediatricians or dentists that children see.
If they thought about it, children, as they go about their
daily activities, might well ask, “Where are the old people?” But children are not likely to ask this question because it is so taken for granted that our social institutions
designed to care for children largely exclude older people. As older people comprise an increasing proportion
of the adult population in coming decades, it is possible
that the average amount of time that children spend interacting with older nonkin could increase. But the starting
level of interaction is so small that any plausible increase
in older people caring for nonkin children would be too
small to make a noticeable difference in the lives of
disadvantaged children. It would require large structural

CHILDREN IN AN AGING SOCIETY

changes that promote greater age integration before a
significant level of direct involvement of older people
with nonkin children could develop.

Conclusions
Demography is not destiny because social structures can
change in multiple ways in response to a changing age distribution. However, because age is a central organizing factor in social structure, the changing age composition of the
population has potential implications for children. Understanding what these implications of population aging are is
a first step toward thinking about what social changes could
protect or enhance the well-being of children. Because of
the central role that families play in the lives of children,
there is little reason to expect that population aging would
have any adverse consequences for children in families with
two well-educated parents. Indeed, the changing older population could bring advantages to these children because they
are increasingly connected to grandparents with significant
amounts of social and economic capital. Therefore, it is
most important to focus on implications of population aging
for the more disadvantaged children in the population.
A significant proportion of American children are growing up in disadvantaged families. A majority of children
have mothers who are not college graduates, 17% are living
in poverty, and 33% are living in single-parent families.
Children who have the least parental resources potentially
have the most to gain from involvement with grandparents,
but they are the least likely to have grandparents with significant resources. Disadvantaged children have the most to
gain from involvement with resourceful older nonkin, but
age segregation means that few older people are involved in
such helping relationships. Disadvantaged children are most
dependent on public spending that could compensate for
their weak parental resources, but children are a decreasing
priority in public spending. Unless priorities in public
spending change, funding for children’s programs will be
challenged by the growing cost of programs for older people
associated with population aging between 2010 and 2030.
The growing divide between advantaged and disadvantaged children in an aging American society is not inevitable. It would be possible for the welfare state to redistribute
more resources to disadvantaged children. This would require either further expanding the size of the domestic budget or reordering priorities in the budget. Either option is
sure to face political opposition, so changes that favor disadvantaged children are unlikely to occur without organized
efforts. It would be possible to better support grandparents
who care for disadvantaged children (Baker & Silverstein,
2008). It would be possible to encourage resourceful older
people to be more involved in mentoring and caring for disadvantaged children other than their own grandchildren.
This could be accomplished by expanding intergenerational
programs, which have the potential to benefit both old and

495

young. Ways to expand involvement of older people with
nonkin children could include expanding incentives for
older people to become engaged, increasing awareness of
opportunities for and benefits of engagement, increasing recruitment efforts to get older people to participate, and increasing financial support for intergenerational programs.
All the changes discussed here to protect vulnerable children are more likely to occur if critical attention is given to
implications of population aging for children, and to the
way in which later life is socially structured. It should also
be noted that failing to adequately invest in children now
will complicate the challenge of meeting needs of the older
population in the future. Investments in children pay dividends of increased economic productivity when these children enter adulthood (Esping-Andersen, 2008).
Acknowledgments
This article is a revised version of the Matilda White Riley Distinguished Scholar Lecture that I presented at the Section on Aging and
the Life Course at the annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association in 2007. I benefited from comments from the audience at
this lecture and from critical comments from Dale Dannefer. Helpful
comments were also provided by Kenneth Ferraro and two reviewers
of the paper for Journals of Gerontology: Social Sciences. Maria
Monserud assisted by analyzing data from the National Survey of
Families and Households.
Correspondence
Address correspondence to Peter Uhlenberg, PhD, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, CB 3210, Chapel Hill, NC 27599.
Email: peter_uhlenberg@unc.edu
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Received October 29, 2008
Accepted December 22, 2008
Decision Editor: Kenneth F. Ferraro, PhD